Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law
Volume 24
Issue 2 Winter 2022

Article 3

5-2022

The Future of AI Accountability in the Financial Markets
Gina-Gail S. Fletcher
Michelle M. Le

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gina-Gail S. Fletcher and Michelle M. Le, The Future of AI Accountability in the Financial Markets, 24
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 289 (2022)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw/vol24/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law by an authorized editor of
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

The Future of AI Accountability
in the Financial Markets
Gina-Gail S. Fletcher* & Michelle M. Le**
ABSTRACT
Consumer interaction with the financial market ranges from
applying for credit cards, to financing the purchase of a home, to buying
and selling securities. And with each transaction, the lender, bank, and
brokerage firm are likely utilizing artificial intelligence (AI) behind the
scenes to augment their operations. While AI’s ability to process data at
high speeds and in large quantities makes it an important tool for
financial institutions, it is imperative to be attentive to the risks and
limitations that accompany its use. In the context of financial markets,
AI’s lack of decision-making transparency, often called the “black box
problem,” along with AI’s dependence on quality data, present
additional complexities when considering the aggregate effect of
algorithms deployed in the market. Owing to these issues, the benefits of
AI must be weighed against the particular risks that accompany the
spread of this technology throughout the markets.
Financial regulation, as it stands, is complex, expensive, and
often involves overlapping regulations and regulators. Thus far,
financial regulators have responded by publishing guidance and
standards for firms utilizing AI tools, but they have stopped short of
demanding access to source codes, setting specific standards for
developers, or otherwise altering traditional regulatory frameworks.
While regulators are no strangers to regulating new financial products
or technology, fitting AI within the traditional frameworks of prudential
regulation, registration requirements, supervision, and enforcement
actions leaves concerning gaps in oversight.
This Article examines the suitability of the current financial
regulatory frameworks for overseeing AI in the financial markets. It
suggests that regulators consider developing multi-faceted approaches
to promote AI accountability. This Article recognizes the potential harms
and likelihood for regulatory arbitrage if these regulatory gaps remain
unattended and thus suggests focusing on key elements for future
regulation—namely, the human developers and regulation of data to
truly “hold AI accountable.” Therefore, holding AI accountable requires
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identifying the different ways in which sophisticated algorithms may
cause harm to the markets and consumers if ineffectively regulated, and
developing an approach that can flexibly respond to these broad
concerns. Notably, this Article cautions against reliance on
self-regulation and recommends that future policies take an adaptive
approach to address current and future AI technologies.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1965, Intel founder, Gordon Moore, predicted that the number
of transistors in a microchip would double every two years, leading to
faster, smaller, more efficient, and cheaper computational power over
time.1 Moore’s prediction has largely come true.2 Over the past eight
years, there has been significant growth in computational power, which
has led to unprecedented innovation and development in the field of

1.
David Rotman, We’re Not Prepared for the End of Moore’s Law, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb.
24, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/02/24/905789/were-not-prepared-for-the-endof-moores-law [https://perma.cc/T6AE-T8H2].
2.
Id.
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artificial intelligence (AI).3 Together, these breakthroughs have driven
forward a new wave of innovation and disruptive technologies,4
embedding AI in countless aspects of our day-to-day lives.5 From the
simple task of parallel parking,6 to complex robotic surgeries,7 AI is
changing the world in which we live, arguably in a net positive way.
The impact of AI is particularly prominent in the financial
markets.8 The ability of algorithms to quickly process vast quantities of
data makes them valuable tools for financial institutions where time is
money and data is king.9 Today, machine learning (a branch of AI) helps
banks make credit decisions, fight fraud, identify illicit financial
transactions, design investment strategies, trade securities, and
enhance personal banking, among other tasks.10 Financial firms have
adopted AI to assist with regulatory compliance by improving processes
for know-your-customer checks and for modeling systemic risk.11 In
short, AI is rapidly changing the operation and, importantly, the
regulation of the financial markets.
The growing prevalence and complexity of AI within the
financial markets present novel regulatory challenges and raise

3.
Specifically, prior to 2012, computational power doubled every two years. See Tibi
Puiu, AI Is Outpacing Moore’s Law, ZME SCI. (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.zmescience.com/science/ai-is-outpacing-moores-law/ [https://perma.cc/T78V-Y4KC]. Post-2012, however, computational power has been doubling every 3.4 months. Id.
4.
See generally Clayton M. Christensen, Michael E. Raynor & Rory McDonald, What Is
Disruptive Innovation?, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2015, at 44, http://glassyad.ir/magazine/economics_marketing/2015/Others/Harvard_Business_Review_USA_-_December_2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S7NL-S76U] (defining disruptive innovation as “a process whereby a smaller
company with fewer resources is able to successfully challenge established incumbent
businesses”).
5.
See Steven Zeitchik, Maybe 2022 Should Be the Year We Turn Over
Decision-Making to the AI, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/12/31/new-year-resolutions-ai-artificial-intelligence/
[https://perma.cc/VF2H-Y8A6].
6.
Lance B. Eliot, Parallel Parking Mindless AI Task for Self-Driving Cars: Time to Step
It Up, AI TRENDS (June 29, 2017), https://www.aitrends.com/ai-insider/parallel-parking-mindlessai-task-self-driving-cars-time-step/ [https://perma.cc/KNF3-PFHU].
7.
See Cade Metz, The Robot Surgeon Will See You Now, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/30/technology/robot-surgery-surgeon.html
[https://perma.cc/VDL3-6KYY].
8.
See Daniel Faggella, Artificial Intelligence Applications for Lending and Loan
Management, EMERJ (Apr. 3, 2020), https://emerj.com/ai-sector-overviews/artificial-intelligenceapplications-lending-loan-management [https://perma.cc/DK22-TLK3].
9.
See id.
10.
See id.; William Magnuson, Artificial Financial Intelligence, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
337, 348 (2020).
11.
See Magnuson, supra note 10, at 342.
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questions about the future and efficacy of financial regulation.12
Traditional financial regulation relies on a patchwork of regulators
utilizing varied regulatory approaches—such as prudential
regulation,13 disclosure, or ex post enforcement actions—to ensure
market efficiency, liquidity, and integrity.14 However, as is often the
case with innovation, AI technology is developing more quickly than
lawmakers can respond, putting lawmakers and regulators at a
disadvantage vis-à-vis the entities and activities they are supposed to
oversee.15 Importantly, AI does not easily fit the categorizations within
the existing legal framework, resulting in regulatory gaps, reactive
rather than proactive regulation, or ill-fitting frameworks that
exacerbate risks and cramp innovation.16
This Article is a preliminary exploration of the future of AI
regulation in the financial markets that focuses on the issue of
accountability. To achieve the most effective use of AI in the financial
markets, there must be a way to hold AI accountable.17 However, merely
imposing the existing regulatory framework on AI is unlikely to provide
the regulatory oversight desired.18 Rather, holding AI accountable
requires an honest appraisal of how AI is different and how these
differences can result in new and greater harms being imposed on the
markets and society if left unchecked.19 Because AI is constantly

12.
See Finale Doshi-Velez & Mason Kortz, Accountability of AI Under the Law: The Role
of Explanation 2 (2017) (Berkman Klein Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y Working Paper), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/34372584/2017-11_aiexplainability-1.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y
[https://perma.cc/7JC2-J957].
13.
Prudential regulation aims to increase the stability of the whole financial system as
well as the risk management of individual financial institutions to ensure the institution has
“safe[] and sound[]” practices. See infra Section II.A; Banking Supervision, FED. RSRV. EDUC.,
https://www.federalreserveeducation.org/about-the-fed/structure-and-functions/banking-supervision [https://perma.cc/6GE3-8AVP] (last visited Apr. 21, 2021).
14.
See CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44918, WHO REGULATES WHOM? AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.
FINANCIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 4–6 (2020), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44918.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2V9Y-NACX].
15.
See Magnuson, supra note 10, at 341–42.
16.
Id. at 339–40.
17.
See Doshi-Velez & Kortz, supra note 12. While AI accountability could be applicable
to regulators or third parties, this Article focuses on a regulator’s ability to effectively hold AI
accountable. Given the essential role of regulators in ensuring the stability, integrity, and
efficiency of the market, it is important to consider how regulatory accountability may be achieved
as a first principle. The ability of third parties to sue or seek to hold AI developers or AI users
liable is beyond the scope of this Article and deserves its own exploration. See Magnuson, supra
note 10, at 366.
18.
But see Magnuson, supra note 10, at 365–66.
19.
See Hilary J. Allen, Driverless Finance, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157, 159–60 (2020).
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evolving,20 so too must regulatory efforts; future regulation must
develop new ways to oversee AI and ensure there are parties who can
be held liable for AI’s accompanying risks and harms.21 Thus, at its core,
AI accountability is seeking to find some measure of balance between
the benefits of AI, on the one hand, and its drawbacks and risks, on the
other hand. Lawmakers and regulators must approach this task
expansively, with an appreciation for the fluidity of AI and the financial
markets. Recognizing that this is no small feat, this Article’s goal is
modest: it considers what features ought to be included in future
regulatory frameworks and highlights one specific feature regulators
ought to adopt sparingly, to effectively hold AI accountable in the
financial markets.22
Part II of this Article discusses the uses of AI in the financial
markets. This Part also identifies the hurdles that complicate AI
regulation, specifically lack of transparency and data dependency. Part
III describes three primary approaches regulators take in regulating AI
within the financial markets. The shortcoming of each approach is
highlighted to underscore the challenges AI poses for the traditional
regulatory framework. Finally, Part IV analyzes elements that
regulators and lawmakers should adopt to create a robust regulatory
approach as AI becomes more ubiquitous in the financial markets.
II. AI IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS
From the basic automation of internal processes, to the complex
algorithms that model systemic risk for systemically important
financial institutions,23 AI is both assisting and revolutionizing the
operation of financial markets.24 AI has facilitated greater
democratization of credit, faster and more precise investment
strategies, and better risk management processes.25 Part II explores

20.
See Magnuson, supra note 10, at 342–45.
21.
See Allen, supra note 19, at 160.
22.
Throughout, this Article refers to holding “AI accountable.” See, e.g., supra note 17
and accompanying text. The authors recognize that AI is not a legally recognized entity under the
law, so AI qua AI cannot be held accountable any more than one can hold a computer
or telephone accountable. See Roman V. Yampolskiy, Could an Artificial Intelligence Be
Considered
a
Person
Under
the
Law?,
PBS
(Oct.
7,
2018,
10:01
AM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/could-an-artificial-intelligence-be-considered-a-personunder-the-law [https://perma.cc/G5JX-5KH8]. Therefore, holding “AI accountable” means holding
AI developers or entities that deploy AI accountable for the consequences of AI. For simplicity and
consistency, however, this Article will refer to “AI accountability.”
23.
See Magnuson, supra note 10, at 348–51.
24.
See id. at 348.
25.
See id.
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three examples of AI in the financial markets: (1) consumer finance, (2)
high-speed trading, and (3) risk management. This Part then discusses
two primary drawbacks associated with AI: the black box problem and
data dependency.
A. Uses of AI in the Financial Markets
For roughly the past decade, financial technology (fintech) and
traditional financial services providers have been leveraging AI
technology to revolutionize their financial product offerings and the
markets in general.26 While the use of AI in the financial markets is
varied, three primary examples are often cited when discussing the
integration of AI into the financial markets. First, credit
decision-making models provide greater access to credit by leveraging
AI to analyze large amounts of alternative data to determine a
borrower’s credit risk.27 Second, traders utilize AI-powered algorithms
to develop investment strategies and execute trades at incredible
speeds.28 Lastly, financial institutions have incorporated AI into their
risk management processes to assist in the complex modeling required
to comply with prudential regulations.29
1. Consumer Finance
One of the fastest-growing applications of AI in the financial
markets is in credit decisioning.30 Traditionally, lenders use a
risk-based strategy in which the bank assesses borrower risk based on
only a few data points such as FICO scores, debt, income, and credit
history.31 Some lenders use AI to analyze larger types and amounts of
data such as the borrower’s education, address stability, rent payment
history, and “digital footprint,” which includes online shopping,
browsing history, and social media activity.32 Using these alternative
data points effectively expands credit access to individuals traditionally

26.
See id.
27.
See Faggella, supra note 8.
28.
See Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in the Capital
Markets, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1609 (2015).
29.
See Emily Liner, Understanding SIFIs: What Makes an Institution Systemically
Important?, THIRD WAY (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.thirdway.org/report/understanding-sifis-whatmakes-an-institution-systemically-important [https://perma.cc/495U-XQ8V].
30.
See Magnuson, supra note 10.
31.
See Faggella, supra note 8.
32.
See id.
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deemed “credit invisibles,” many of whom are minorities.33 As the
Federal Reserve noted, the use of AI and nontraditional data has the
potential to “improve the accuracy and fairness of credit decisions while
also increasing overall credit availability.”34
One example of AI-enabled credit decision-making is Upstart’s
Credit Decision API.35 Upstart’s AI models incorporate fifteen hundred
variables tailorable to each lender’s specific credit policies.36 The models
also automatically generate Adverse Action Notices for rejections,
which are a legal requirement for credit lenders.37 Not to be displaced
by fintech, industry players like Equifax and Experian have also
incorporated AI into their credit models.38
Yet, these algorithms may also amplify racial biases and credit
inequities.39 Developers and lenders often lack visibility into how the
models classify and process an individual’s data points,40 which can
result in “proxy discrimination.”41 Further, if the algorithms use data
that reflect past discriminatory decisions or data that correlate to race,
outcomes may result in a form of digital redlining.42 Such improper
33.
See id.; Monica Steinisch, Alternative Date: Helpful or Harmful?, CONSUMER
ACTION NEWS, Summer 2017, at 1, 4.
34.
Lael Brainard, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Speech
at the AI Academic Symposium: Supporting Responsible Use of AI and Equitable
Outcomes
in
Financial
Services
(Jan.
12,
2021),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20210112a.htm [https://perma.cc/C3X7-JRBE] [hereinafter
Speech at the AI Academic Symposium].
35.
Alex Rouse, Introducing the Credit Decision API for Banks, UPSTART, https://www.upstart.com/blog/introducing-credit-decision-api [https://perma.cc/S6AY-WG26] (last visited Jan. 22,
2022).
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
See Alex Hickey, Equifax Debuts Machine Leaning-Based Credit Scoring System, CIO
DIVE (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.ciodive.com/news/equifax-debuts-machine-learning-basedcredit-scoring-system/520095 [https://perma.cc/NTV7-S4U3]; Gregory Wright, Bringing Machine
Learning to Data Analytics, EXPERIAN: INSIGHTS BLOG (May 9, 2017), https://www.experian.com/blogs/insights/2017/05/machine-learning-with-analytical-sandbox
[https://perma.cc/MRM3-P7GB].
39.
Sian Townson, AI Can Make Bank Loans More Fair, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 6, 2020),
https://hbr.org/2020/11/ai-can-make-bank-loans-more-fair [https://perma.cc/448F-CE6M].
40.
See Loren Picard & Joe Flanagan, AI May Just Create the Illusion of Good Credit
Decisions, AM. BANKER (May 7, 2017, 9:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/ai-mayjust-create-the-illusion-of-good-credit-decisions [https://perma.cc/2YCD-N7AS].
41.
See Anya E.R. Prince & Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy Discrimination in the Age of
Artificial Intelligence and Big Data, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1257, 1266 (2020); see also
AARON KLEIN, BROOKINGS INST., CREDIT DENIAL IN THE AGE OF AI (2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/credit-denial-in-the-age-of-ai/ [https://perma.cc/7PZ2-THSZ]
(explaining that “proxy discrimination” occurs when “the predictive power of a facially-neutral
characteristic is at least partially attributable to its correlation with a suspect classifier.”).
42.
Speech at the AI Academic Symposium, supra note 34.

296

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 24:2:289

outcomes may go unnoticed as existing consumer protections for credit
decisions are largely based on transparency—specifically, the right to
know why you are denied credit under the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act (ECOA).43 But, because of the inherent difficulty of generating
explanations understandable to humans,44 credit decision-making
algorithms may struggle to comply with these legal requirements.45 For
example, the algorithm may not have an explainable decision path,
especially if there is no single reason for denial.46
Relatedly, the use of “alternative data” raises privacy, ethical,
and legal concerns as to the boundaries of what data can be collected
and how it should be used.47 “[J]ust because there is a statistical
relationship does not mean that it is predictive, or even that it is legally
allowable to be incorporated into a credit decision.”48 Therefore, it is
important to develop guardrails that prevent these negative outcomes
as AI usage increases in credit decisions.
Thus, while AI is improving credit accessibility for historically
marginalized groups,49 it may also reinforce discriminatory lending and
strip away individual privacy.50 As AI is relied upon to make these types
of important decisions, it is imperative that regulators find ways to
ensure that AI does not exacerbate the problems it is intended to
address, namely credit access, particularly for marginalized groups.51

43.
KLEIN, supra note 41; see Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691; Your
Equal Credit Opportunity Rights, FED. TRADE COMM’N: CONSUMER INFO. (Jan. 2013),
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0347-your-equal-credit-opportunity-rights
[https://perma.cc/L3MD-SPNP].
44.
See infra Part II.B.
45.
See KLEIN, supra note 41.
46.
See id.
47.
Id.; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., NAT’L CREDIT UNION ADMIN. & OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
INTERAGENCY STATEMENT ON THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE DATA IN CREDIT UNDERWRITING (2013),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/caletters/CA%201911%20Letter%20Attachement%20Interagency%20Statement%20on%20the%20Use%20of%20Alternative%20Data%20in%20Credit%20Underwriting.pdf [https://perma.cc/KAV8-JH2R].
48.
KLEIN, supra note 41.
49.
See Shannen Balogh & Carter Johnson, AI Can Help Reduce Inequity in Credit Access,
but Banks Will Have to Trade Off Fairness for Accuracy – for Now, BUS. INSIDER
(June 30, 2021, 8:30 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/ai-lending-risks-opportunities-creditdecisioning-data-inequity-2021-6 [https://perma.cc/NYW9-69GE].
50.
See KLEIN, supra note 41.
51.
See id.
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2. High-Speed Trading
Machine learning and algorithms have become ubiquitous in
trading—not only the actual buying and selling of securities and
commodities in the markets, but also the development and execution of
investment strategies.52 Firms harnessing AI’s computational power
can set the algorithm’s instructions to a preset trading strategy to
submit orders and route and process trades at speeds much faster than
possible with only human traders.53 More recently, machine learning
has been incorporated into trading algorithms to enable them to learn
from available data, assess inputs to identify trading opportunities, and
implement complex investment strategies.54 Over the past ten or more
years, algorithmic trading has risen in prominence and, at times,
accounted for at least 60 percent of all trading done in the markets.55
Some scholars note that unlocking AI-powered, high-speed
trading benefits the financial market through lowered costs, increased
liquidity for traders, and improved informational efficiencies because of
the “rapidly responsive prices.”56 However, in abnormal market
conditions, the algorithm’s speed backfires.57 And, in these instances,
the prevalence of AI increases the likelihood of an AI-induced systemic
event akin to the Flash Crash of 2010.58
Efforts to address and regulate financial algorithms are
complicated by AI’s dependence on “good” data, preset programming,
and models over which developers have little control after launch.59 A
52.
See Yadav, supra note 28, at 1609–10.
53.
Id. at 1611.
54.
See Paul Wilcox, Capsule Networks: Deep Learning Computer Vision for Stock
Forecasting, NEURAVEST (July 15, 2019), https://neuravest.net/capsule-networks-deep-learningfor-stock-forecasting/ [https://perma.cc/78EY-E7FW] (discussing convolutional neural networks
application to trading).
55.
Hakan Samuelsson, What Percentage of Trading Is Algorithmic? (Algo Trading
Volume), THE ROBUST TRADER (Jan. 8, 2022), https://therobusttrader.com/what-percentage-oftrading-is-algorithmic/ [https://perma.cc/8DAA-NHVU].
56.
Yadav, supra note 28, at 1611; Allen, supra note 19, at 170.
57.
See Allen, supra note 19, at 170.
58.
See id.; Hilary J. Allen, The SEC as Financial Stability Regulator, 43 J. CORP. L. 715,
737–38 (2018) (detailing various crashes attributed to high frequency trading algorithms). The
Flash Crash of 2010 involved the US stock market losing—and then recovering—nearly one
thousand points in the span of roughly an hour, an event driven by manic, software-driven selling.
Mark Melin, Here’s What Actually Caused the 2010 “Flash Crash”, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 30,
2016, 9:57 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/what-actually-caused-2010-flash-crash-2016-1
[https://perma.cc/LS9M-VLHX]; see Jamie Condliffe, Algorithms Probably Caused a Flash
Crash of the British Pound, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/2016/10/07/244656/algorithms-probably-caused-a-flash-crash-of-the-british-pound/
[https://perma.cc/2DWU-CZ6E].
59.
See Magnuson, supra note 10, at 353–57.

298

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 24:2:289

developer’s ex ante choices regarding trading strategies, assumptions
(e.g., about the behavior of the market and other actors), methodologies,
and risk preferences must attempt to predict the situations that the
algorithms may face, then code and train the algorithms to act
appropriately on its own and at high speeds.60 In other words, if the
algorithms’ parameters are inaccurate, imprecise, or based on outdated
data, the resulting outputs may distort the market rather than achieve
a successful trading strategy.61 If the algorithms base their decisions on
data and trends from one period of time that looks fundamentally
different from the market in which the algorithm currently operates,
then the algorithms may disrupt the markets to the detriment of other
market actors.62
Notably, machine learning algorithms are susceptible to
herd-like behavior of two kinds, each of which can have negative
consequences for the financial markets.63 First, similarly designed
financial algorithms that analyze similar financial information may
reach the same conclusions.64 Second, dissimilar financial algorithms
may incorporate the results of other algorithms in its decision-making
without reference to the soundness of the other algorithm’s decision.65
Thus, in the aggregate, the reactions of many financial algorithms to
new information can exacerbate market volatility and instability and,
in turn, increase systemic risk within the markets.66
Overall, AI trading has improved liquidity, making it easier and
cheaper for traders, particularly retail traders, to access the secondary
capital markets.67 These benefits, however, may be at the expense of
market stability68—making it all the more important that financial
regulators credibly deter and mitigate against these risks to the broader
financial markets.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See Yadav, supra note 28, at 1612.
See id. at 1612–16.
See id. at 1617–22; Magnuson, supra note 10, at 357; Allen, supra note 19, at 171.
See Magnuson, supra note 10, at 364–65.
Id. at 364.
Id. at 364–65.
Id. at 357.
Allen, supra note 19, at 170.
Id.
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3. Risk Management
Financial institutions rely on AI to identify and manage risks
that threaten the “safety and soundness” of the institution.69 Both
regulators and regulated institutions manage risk by using algorithmic
computational power to process large quantities of bank transactions
and other data, make predictions about future issues, and identify
existing and potential sources of risks within the institution, such as
liquidity demands or market movements.70 These outcomes then dictate
the level of scrutiny with which prudential regulators oversee the
institution to mitigate the institution’s systemic risk.71
To illustrate, prudential regulators impose capital requirements
on financial institutions mandating that banks hold certain levels of
capital to reduce the risk of bank runs.72 Moreover, entities deemed
systemically important financial institutions (SIFI) are subject to
additional capital requirement surcharges and stress testing
requirements, among other enhanced prudential regulations.73 The
largest SIFIs may be classified as global systemically important banks
(G-SIB), which impose even higher capital surcharges depending on the
riskiness of the institution, in addition to the SIFI enhanced prudential
regulations.74 Because enhanced regulations are extremely costly,
financial institutions are incentivized to ensure that internal risk
management measures are robust and accurate to avoid fines or
unexpected compliance costs.75
With the integration of AI into risk management, the model may
itself be a source of risk. For example, the algorithm may overestimate
(or underestimate) potential risks when faced with real-world inputs
that differ from or are more nuanced than data on which it was

69.
See Speech at the AI Academic Symposium, supra note 34. Prudential regulators, also
referred to as “safety and soundness” regulators, review financial institutions in two ways:
CAMELS ratings and the “5-Cs.” Banking Supervision, supra note 13. CAMELS rating looks at
the bank’s capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to
market risk. Id. Essentially, this rating assesses the overall health of the financial institution and
its ability to manage risk, which subsequently dictates the bank’s prudential regulations. Id. The
“5-Cs” approach focuses on the bank’s lending activity and rates the bank by assessing a sample
of the bank’s loans based on capacity, collateral, condition, capital, and character. Id.
70.
See Banking Supervision, supra note 13; Speech at the AI Academic Symposium,
supra note 34.
71.
See Banking Supervision, supra note 13; Liner, supra note 29.
72.
See Liner, supra note 29.
73.
See id. for a discussion of the process for SIFI and G-SIB designation and regulation.
74.
Id.
75.
Speech at the AI Academic Symposium, supra note 34.
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trained.76 Such miscalculations can have devastating impacts because
financial institutions are susceptible to financial contagion.77
Prudential regulators consider a bank’s exposure to contagion risk
when determining whether the financial institution should be classified
as a G-SIB, thereby subjecting the institution to enhanced prudential
standards such as higher capital and liquidity requirements.78
Therefore, if the bank’s initial internal risk assessment underestimates
its contagion risk, the bank may be pushed into higher G-SIB (and
G-SIB capital surcharge) tiers.79
Federal Reserve Governor Brainard highlighted the increased
stakes for financial institutions that rely upon AI for “crucial tasks” to
ensure compliance with “safety and soundness” regulations:
For example, they need to be sure that the model would not make grossly inaccurate
predictions when it confronts inputs from the real world either that differ in some
subtle way from the training data or that are based on a highly complex interaction
of the data features.80

As such, financial institutions need to be confident that their
algorithms are robust and their predictions are reliable in order to reap
the expected benefits of AI in risk management.81
In sum, AI is shaping the markets in significant ways, but it is
also introducing new sources of risks.82 Excluding AI from the markets
is neither desirable nor feasible;83 therefore, it is necessary to
76.
See PHILIPP HÄRLE, ANDRAS HAVAS, ANDREAS KREMER, DANIEL RONA
& HAMID SAMANDARI, THE FUTURE OF BANK RISK MANAGEMENT 13 (2015), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business%20functions/risk/our%20insights/the%20future%20of%20bank%20risk%20management/the-future-of-bank-risk-management-full-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8Y6F-F4HA].
77.
See id. Contagion risk is a type of nonfinancial risk that banks must assess as part of
overall risk management. Id. Because of the interconnectedness of today’s global financial system,
there is a risk of financial contagion where volatility and negative market developments in one
part or portfolio of a bank can spread to other parts of the financial institution, the broader
financial market, and even to other parties. See id.
78.
Id.
79.
Id.; FIN. STABILITY BD., 2020 LIST OF GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS
(G-SIBS) (2020), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P111120.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9LPMXWW] (detailing the enhanced standards for each “bucket” of G-SIBs).
80.
Speech at the AI Academic Symposium, supra note 34.
81.
Id.
82.
Allen, supra note 19, at 170.
83.
See id. (discussing some of the benefits AI brings to the market);
ORÇUN KAYA, DEUTSCHE BANK RSCH., HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING: REACHING THE LIMITS (2016),
https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/RPS_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000454703/Research_Briefing
%3A_High-frequency_trading.pdf?undefined&realload=QJgjZ4lUB0gdDpFjo
W9epAcERwOBdE/P4CrZGy/0fhI/KQOMvci~p1aITx07FWnX
[https://perma.cc/3WD2-ETCD]
(discussing the extensive role AI plays in the markets); Darrell M. West & John R. Allen, How
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understand the root cause of these risks in order to better hold AI
accountable.
B. The Problem with AI
There are two issues at the core of the seemingly varied
problems that accompany AI in the financial markets: lack of
transparency and data dependency.84 The lack of transparency problem
is often articulated as the “black box problem” and refers to the
difficulty humans have when attempting to understand or explain how
AI arrives at its output.85 Data dependency, as its name suggests, refers
to AI’s overreliance on data, which may be flawed or inaccurate,
resulting in negative consequences for the markets or users.86 Each
issue is discussed in greater detail in the subsections below.
1. The Black Box Problem
The black box problem refers to the opacity inherent in AI
algorithms that makes it difficult, if not impossible, to understand the
algorithm’s decision-making process (or to predict its outcomes).87 In
developing machine learning algorithms, programmers specify a goal or
goals for the algorithm to achieve but do not specify how the algorithm
should solve the problem.88 Rather, the algorithm builds its own model
by dynamically learning from data provided, assessing inputs, and
incorporating new data to solve the problem.89 In learning through trial
and error from the available data, the algorithm can make decisions,
find patterns, and solve problems—all without human involvement.90
How the algorithm determines its output is often unknown to the
programmer, thereby rendering the decision-making process opaque
Artificial Intelligence Is Transforming the World, BROOKINGS (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-artificial-intelligence-is-transforming-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/2KMQSWVS].
84.
See Magnuson, supra note 10 at 355–59; Speech at the AI Academic Symposium, supra
note 34.
85.
See Speech at the AI Academic Symposium, supra note 34.
86.
Magnuson, supra note 10, at 355–56.
87.
Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and the Failure of Intent and
Causation, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 889, 902–03 (2018).
88.
Id. at 907.
89.
Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA
L. REV. 54, 68–69 (2019) (“[T]oday, machine learning algorithms are trained on a body of data that
is selected by designers or by past human practices. This process is the ‘learning’ element in
machine learning; the algorithm learns, for example, how to pair queries and results based on a
body of data that produced satisfactory pairs in the past.”).
90.
See Bathaee, supra note 87, at 891.
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even to the algorithm’s coders.91 Accordingly, the black box problem
presents two regulatory challenges.92 From an ex ante perspective, if
regulators continue to rely on supervision and oversight to hold AI
accountable, there must be recognition of the innate opacity of these
algorithms in designing an effective regulatory regime.93 From an ex
post perspective, it is unclear whether the current liability and
securities supervisory and enforcement regimes are suited to and
capable of adequately regulating algorithms.94
The ability of algorithms to make decisions, independent of
human involvement, raises issues related to liability.95 The current
securities regime requires a level of intentionality in wrongdoing that
may not be possible to demonstrate if AI engages in misconduct.96 While
an easy retort may be that lawmakers should hold programmers liable
for the actions of their algorithms, proving that the programmer
possessed the requisite level of intent or recklessness to be liable for the
conduct of the AI is not a straightforward feat under the securities
laws.97 As such, the current liability framework’s requirement of
deliberate, intentional human wrongdoing may not capture misconduct
done through, with, or by an algorithm.98
2. Data Dependency
Part of what makes AI so powerful is its ability to process vast
quantities of data in very short timeframes.99 The processing
capabilities of algorithms—which enable pattern recognition beyond
the linear, traditional approaches to data—are far superior to that of
humans.100 In short, AI depends on data to work.101 However, this data
dependency brings with it a host of concerns, especially regarding the
quality and source of the data being used.102 The soundness of the types
91.
Id. at 903.
92.
See generally Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Deterring Algorithmic Manipulation, 74 VAND. L.
REV. 101 (2021).
93.
See id. at 107.
94.
See id. at 105; Yesha Yadav, The Failure of Liability in Modern Markets, 102 VA. L.
REV. 1031, 1073–86 (2016).
95.
See Fletcher, supra note 92, at 105.
96.
See id.
97.
See id.; Yadav, supra note 94, at 1074–75.
98.
See Yadav, supra note 94, at 1075.
99.
Id. at 1064.
100.
Id. at 1065.
101.
Magnuson, supra note 10, at 355.
102.
See id. at 356 (discussing the data dependency problem).
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of financial decisions delegated to algorithms depends on the human
developer’s choice of training data and how that developer codes the
algorithm to use the data.103 Data can have built-in biases that
perpetuate problematic decision-making, or they may have inaccuracies
that cause the algorithm to undervalue the likelihood of rare but
seismic events.104 Thus, the quality of the data depends upon the
knowledge and sophistication of developers who must identify and
rectify inaccurate or otherwise harmful data sets.105
Even beyond the possibility of flawed data, algorithms may be
programmed to react similarly to data and market developments,
potentially resulting in a feedback loop among algorithms in the
market.106 This herd-like behavior can have a significant impact on
market volatility, negatively affecting liquidity and market stability.107
As noted above, herd-like behavior could exacerbate the consequences
of a disastrous asset valuation bubble or magnify the momentum in a
particular trend leading to a dramatic and catastrophic market
collapse.108 Further, if several financial institutions or actors rely on AI
caught in a feedback loop, it will become difficult for the market to
self-correct, thereby obscuring the efficiency and transparency of the
market.109
Also, financial market applications of AI face the problem of
“non-stationary” behavior.110 Because algorithms in financial markets
must generally rely upon historical data, the types of statistical trends
that an algorithm may discover based on past market conditions may
not be appropriately generalized for future market conditions and new
data.111 Thus, not only can flawed data amplify harmful biases, but an
algorithm’s outputs may be inaccurate or improper because the prior
data is inapplicable to future-looking predictions.112
Lastly, there are social, ethical, and privacy concerns regarding
the increasing value of data and large data sets.113 Controlling vast
amounts of data is a major competitive advantage and creates a
significant incentive for firms to collect as much data as possible, which
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 363.
See id.
See id. at 363–65.
See id. at 357.
Id.
Id. at 360.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 357–58.
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can lead to new and legally gray methods of gathering more data.114
Observers need not look further than the countless lawsuits and
complaints against social media sites for their data collection, data
storage, and use of user data for advertising purposes.115 Data
dependency, therefore, not only poses a problem for how AI operates but
also imposes negative externalities on third parties in its quest for ever
more data.
III. REGULATING AI TODAY
The regulation of AI is, in many ways, uncharted territory for
regulators.116 Undoubtedly, AI has revolutionized the markets,117 and
its development ought to be encouraged. But it has also introduced
particularly thorny and pernicious problems that raise concerns about
its use in the markets.118 To date, regulators have relied primarily on
their traditional framework of supervision and enforcement to address
the problems that arise with machine learning in the financial
markets.119 While supervision and enforcement are necessary elements
of an overall regulatory approach to the financial markets, more is
needed to adequately address the issues attendant with the integration
and operation of AI in the markets.120 Part III considers the current
patchwork regulations that address AI and highlights their
shortcomings.
A. Prudential Regulation
In general, prudential regulation ensures that financial
institutions have “safe and sound” banking practices with a specific
focus on the institution’s risk management and risk mitigation
strategies.121 The main prudential regulators are the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors who, along with other entity-specific bank
regulators, determine the “safety and soundness” rules that define
acceptable behavior and risk management for financial institutions.122
114.
Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 399, 420–23 (2017).
115.
See Magnuson, supra note 10, at 358.
116.
See Calo, supra note 114, at 428.
117.
See generally Yadav, supra note 94.
118.
Id. at 1036–37.
119.
See id. at 1089.
120.
See id. at 1073.
121.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
122.
See Banking Supervision, supra note 13.
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Moreover, regulators use supervisory power to oversee and modify
participants’ conduct through examination or investigations.123
The banking industry is no stranger to the use of complex
algorithmic models and quantitative analyses for risk management.124
Faced with a wide range of financial activities and products, banks have
turned to data-driven algorithmic models to assist with complex tasks
such as measuring risk, determining capital and reserve adequacy, and
valuing credit exposures.125 In response, prudential regulators, such as
the Federal Reserve, have used rulemaking power to set the parameters
for financial institutions’ use of complex algorithms. Similarly,
regulators have used their supervisory powers to evaluate models and
processes that firms have in place for developing and monitoring
algorithms.126 Additionally, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB), along with other federal banking regulators, issued a Request
for Information on the use of AI by financial institutions, signaling that
its examinations may become more critical of how firms use and
manage risk associated with AI models.127
Broadly speaking, there are two methods that prudential
regulators focus on when regulating model risk: the model’s source code
and performance.128 First, regulators can require a particular degree of
source-code transparency and explanations for the model’s outputs by
relying on a disclosure and transparency scheme.129 Disclosure
approaches can be useful for targeted testing of the model’s
decision-making when presented with specific inputs.130 Yet, “source
code is notoriously complex and inscrutable” for both less complex
123.
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44918, WHO REGULATES WHOM? AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.
FINANCIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 3 (2020), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44918.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2V9Y-NACX].
124.
See
B D.
OF
GOVERNORS
OF
THE
FED.
RSRV.
SYS.,
SR
11-7,
SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE ON MODEL RISK MANAGEMENT 1 (2011), https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1107.pdf [https://perma.cc/HMC6-R55Z] [hereinafter MODEL
RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE]; Lael Brainard, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Rsrv. Sys., Speech at Fintech and the New Financial Landscape: What Are
We Learning About Artificial Intelligence in Financial Services? (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20181113a.htm [https://perma.cc/DR4S-LEP4] [hereinafter Speech at Fintech and the New Financial Landscape].
125.
MODEL RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 124, at 1.
126.
See Speech at Fintech and the New Financial Landscape, supra note 124.
127.
Request for Information and Comment on Financial Institutions’ Use of Artificial
Intelligence, Including Machine Learning, 86 Fed. Reg. 16837 (Mar. 31, 2021).
128.
See generally Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of
Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127 (2009).
129.
Doshi-Velez & Kortz, supra note 12, at 2–4; FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX
SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 142–43 (2015).
130.
Magnuson, supra note 10, at 376.
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preprogrammed AI and more complex unsupervised AI algorithms.
Thus, even simple mistakes may be difficult to discover, particularly if
they are novel.131 Further, static testing of the source code does not
provide insight into how the model will interact in its environment on
its own without constant examination from regulators.132
Second, regulators can follow the traditional prudential
approach by promulgating additional expectations for dynamic testing
and auditing protocols under the umbrella of the “safety and soundness”
mandate.133 For example, in 2011, the Federal Reserve’s “Supervisory
Guidance on Model Risk Management” emphasized that financial
institutions utilizing AI tools must embed “safety and soundness”
principles, namely critical analysis and controls, throughout the
development, implementation, and deployment of models.134 This
guidance advised institutions that effective model risk management
must include “effective challenge” to the model accomplished through
testing the theory and logic underlying the model’s design, validating
the data and the model, and testing the model’s performance over a
range of inputs.135 Additionally, the effective challenge includes
implementing governance policies and controls for the model’s
development, implementation, use, and validation.136 In sum, firms that
materially rely upon algorithms for risk management must maintain a
high level of supervision over their models by closely monitoring
model performance, making appropriate adjustments, and utilizing
supplemental information when necessary.137
Furthermore, the Federal Reserve highlighted similar
expectations for financial institutions that outsourced AI-based tools
and services.138 Federal Reserve Governor Brainard recently signaled
an important expansion of regulation suggesting that the Federal
Reserve may propose baseline expectations for banks that use AI

131.
Id. at 377.
132.
See Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R.
Reidenberg, David G. Robinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 647
(2017).
133.
See Speech at Fintech and the New Financial Landscape, supra note 124.
134.
Id.; MODEL RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 124, at 4.
135.
MODEL RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 124, at 4.
136.
Id.
137.
Id.
138.
Speech at Fintech and the New Financial Landscape, supra note 124; BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., SR 13-19/CA 13-21, GUIDANCE ON MANAGING
OUTSOURCING RISK (2021), https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1319.htm
[https://perma.cc/H54F-VCGE] [hereinafter GUIDANCE ON MANAGING OUTSOURCING RISK].
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models to complement traditional “safety and soundness” policies.139
The proposed expectations would require interpretable models to be
reviewed by regulators and, for opaque models, would require black box
testing methods to “derive their explanations post hoc based on the
model’s behavior.”140
Overall, regulators have embraced a risk-focused supervisory
approach that tailors the level of regulatory scrutiny to the potential
risks posed by the specific approach, tool, model, or process used.141 The
Federal Reserve believes such an approach enables regulators to
balance the proper mitigation of AI risks with responsible innovation
that may expand consumer access and convenience as well as provide
greater efficiency, risk detection, and accuracy for the risk management
operations of financial institutions.142 Since 2011, however, the models
used by financial institutions have become increasingly complex as
newer AI techniques, such as machine learning, are incorporated.143
This renders much of the Federal Reserve’s published guidance on
model development obsolete and inapplicable, effectively leaving AI
unregulated from a prudential standpoint.144
B. Registration & Supervision
Regulators rely on their registration and supervisory authority
to oversee market actors and their activities.145 The two primary
financial market regulators, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC),
require market participants to register prior to trading, which plays a
key role in the oversight and supervision of the markets.146 The SEC,
for example, requires issuers to provide specific information regarding
the company, its financial condition, and future plans before offering

139.
Speech at the AI Academic Symposium, supra note 34.
140.
Id. Broadly speaking, interpretable models are capable of generating explanations
that humans can understand. See Doshi-Velez & Kortz, supra note 12, at 3–4. On the other hand,
opaque models may be too complex or otherwise incapable of generating such interpretable
explanations. See Speech at the AI Academic Symposium, supra note 34.
141.
Speech at Fintech and the New Financial Landscape, supra note 124.
142.
Id.
143.
Id.
144.
See supra Section II.A.
145.
See, e.g., GUIDANCE ON MANAGING OUTSOURCING RISK, supra note 138.
146.
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44918, WHO REGULATES WHOM? AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.
FINANCIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 3 (2020), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44918.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2V9Y-NACX].
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any securities to the public.147 Similarly, the CFTC requires all persons
who trade in futures and derivatives to register with the agency or seek
an exemption prior to trading.148
The SEC and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA) have implemented a series of algorithmic trading rules that
require registration and impose regulatory supervision.149 For example,
under FINRA Rule 1220, two categories of persons are required to
register as a “Securities Trader” and pass a qualifying examination: (1)
those responsible for the design, development, or modification of an
algorithmic trading program and (2) those responsible for the
day-to-day supervision and monitoring of algorithmic trading.150 The
rule’s purpose is to force firms to identify and register the persons who
“possess knowledge of and responsibility for, both the design of the
intended trading strategy…and the technological implementation of
such strategy…sufficient to evaluate whether the [algorithm] is
designed…to achieve…regulatory compliance.”151
Further, traders are required to adopt a “reasonable supervision
and control program” to mitigate potential issues that may arise from
algorithmic trading.152 In offering guidance to the industry on what an
effective supervisory program ought to look like, FINRA includes
certain considerations.153 For example, FINRA recommends that firms
review their trading strategies and activities holistically and
implement intra-firm risk committees to identify and assess the risks
147.
Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C
§§ 77a–77mm); see DON MAYER, DANIEL WARNER, GEORGE SIEDEL & JETHRO K.
LIEBERMAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE MANAGEMENT AND FINANCE (2012), https://saylordotorg.github.io/text_legal-aspects-of-corporate-management-and-finance/s20-01-the-nature-ofsecurities-regul.html [https://perma.cc/2ZG4-YK2M].
148.
Who Has to Register, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, https://www.nfa.futures.org/registrationmembership/who-has-to-register/index.html [https://perma.cc/2RJF-REDZ] (last visited Jan. 23,
2022).
149.
New Requirements for Algorithmic Traders May Prove Challenging, VENABLE
(Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.venable.com/insights/publications/2016/09/new-requirements-for-algorithmic-traders-may-prove [https://perma.cc/W3XG-SMB2].
150.
Rule
1220.
Registration
Categories,
FIN.
INDUS.
REGUL.
AUTH.,
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/1220 [https://perma.cc/VR34-SWA8]
(last visited Aug. 20, 2021); see FIN. INDUS. REGUL. AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 16-21,
QUALIFICATION AND REGISTRATION OF ASSOCIATED PERSONS RELATING TO ALGORITHMIC
TRADING
3
(2016),
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Regulatory-Notice-16-21.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JQ82-MLVT] [hereinafter REGULATORY NOTICE 16-21].
151.
REGULATORY NOTICE 16-21, supra note 150.
152.
Algorithmic Trading, FIN. INDUS. REGUL. AUTH., https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/key-topics/algorithmic-trading#overview [https://perma.cc/7JFU-X2F2] (last visited Aug. 20,
2021).
153.
Id.
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that accompany algorithmic trading.154 FINRA also recommends that
firms focus on developing, testing, and validating their algorithms to
ensure regulatory compliance.155 Altogether, the SEC and FINRA have
a reasonable registration and supervision framework applicable to
algorithmic trading that imposes ex ante requirements on persons
when developing and deploying algorithms.156 Moreover, the regulatory
framework also provides regulators with data on how algorithms are
operating in the markets and the impact of these trading strategies on
the market.157
Recently, the CFTC also adopted regulations aimed at
addressing algorithmic trading risks.158 In December 2020, the agency
adopted “risk principles” to guide algorithmic trading in the
commodities markets.159 The three risk principles applicable to
commodities exchanges require: (1) rules to prevent, detect, and
mitigate market disruptions; (2) risk controls; and (3) notification of the
CFTC of significant market disruptions.160 With the new regulations,
the CFTC has shifted to a supervisory approach that provides
exchanges with flexibility to implement rules that can evolve and grow
alongside the markets and technological innovation.161
Both the SEC and the CFTC have taken a principles-focused
approach to regulating algorithmic trading,162 which has its benefits
and drawbacks. In relying on principles,163 the agencies provide market
actors with flexibility to evolve with new technologies and market
realities.164 However, a principles-only approach can be so amorphous
154.
155.
156.

Id.
Id.
See FIN. INDUS. REGUL. AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 15-09, EQUITY TRADING
INITIATIVES: SUPERVISION AND CONTROL PRACTICES FOR ALGORITHMIC TRADING STRATEGIES
(2015), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/notice_doc_file_ref/Notice_Regulatory_15-09.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4UK6-4GT6] [hereinafter REGULATORY NOTICE 15-09] (proposing various risk
management options for algorithmic trading firms).
157.
See id.
158.
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 8188-20, CFTC APPROVES
TWO FINAL RULES AND TWO PROPOSED RULES AT JUNE 25 OPEN MEETING (2020),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8188-20 [https://perma.cc/F8TU-EXPW].
159.
Electronic Trading Risk Principles, 86 Fed. Reg. 2048, 2048, 2072 (Jan. 11, 2021) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 38).
160.
Id. at 2048.
161.
See id. at 2073.
162.
Donna Parisi, Geoffrey Goldman & Azam Aziz, CFTC Considers New
Approach to Regulation of Electronic Trading, SHEARMAN (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.shearman.com/Perspectives/2020/09/CFTC-Considers-New-Approach-to-Regulation-of-ElectronicTrading?sc_lang=zh-CN [https://perma.cc/3QPV-KRTX].
163.
Electronic Trading Risk Principles, 86 Fed. Reg. at 2049.
164.
Id.; see Parisi et al., supra note 162.

310

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 24:2:289

that it ultimately regulates nothing.165 The absence of any prescriptive
rules to guide the creation or use of AI in the markets gives a lot of
discretion to market actors.166 Additionally, regulatory enforcement of
principles may be difficult because the line between acceptable and
unacceptable or reasonable and unreasonable can be indeterminate.167
Notably, financial regulation utilizes both direct government
oversight and oversight by self-regulatory organizations (SROs).168
SROs are private entities that write and enforce rules and standards of
conduct for member organizations, subject to broader government
oversight.169 For example, the SEC oversees several SROs, including
FINRA and the National Securities Exchanges.170 Operating under the
SEC’s oversight, FINRA writes standards of conduct for
broker-dealer members and its associated persons, has the power to
discipline rule breakers, and may exclude entities from broker-dealer
activities.171 Accordingly, the broker-dealer space is regulated by both
FINRA rules and enforcement as well as specific SEC regulations under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.172
SRO delegation in the financial industry has distinct benefits for
investor protection, including the promotion of expertise and lower
regulatory costs.173 Proponents of SROs claim that self-regulatory
bodies are better capable of attracting industry expertise as well as
combining this expertise with contextual flexibility to enable innovation
165.
Electronic Trading Risk Principles, 86 Fed. Reg. at 2073.
166.
Id.
167.
See Rostin Behnam, Comm’r, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n,
Dissenting Statement Regarding Electronic Trading Risk Principles (Dec. 8, 2020),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/behnamstatement120820
[https://perma.cc/7PW9-F2SU]. Specific to the CFTC, there is the additional critique that the
recently adopted electronic trading-risk principles do not improve upon or change the status quo.
Id. Although the risk principles impose a “new” framework of supervision on algorithmic trading,
they mostly restate actions that exchanges already do. Id.
168.
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44918, WHO REGULATES WHOM? AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.
FINANCIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 20 (2020), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44918.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2V9Y-NACX].
169.
Id.
170.
Id.
171.
Magnuson, supra note 10, at 373–74 (discussing broker-dealer self-regulation under
FINRA).
172.
See Letter from Robert W. Cook, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fin. Indus.
Regul. Auth., to Sen. Elizabeth Warren (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FINRA%20Response.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7ND-SMEH].
173.
CFA INST., SELF-REGULATION IN THE SECURITIES MARKETS: TRANSITIONS AND
NEW POSSIBILITIES 5 (2013), https://www.cfainstitute.org/-/media/documents/article/position-paper/self-regulation-in-securities-markets-transitions-new-possibilities.ashx
[https://perma.cc/87PX-952R].
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while still addressing risk.174 Additionally, delegation to SROs shifts
the burden and cost of monitoring and enforcement to the industry.175
However, the benefits of delegation are countered by significant
concerns regarding accountability and conflicts of interest.176 SROs are
commonly criticized due to the inherent conflict of interest between its
regulatory goals and the interests of its members.177 Thus, despite the
perceived advantages of self-regulation,178 there are legitimate concerns
that SROs may face significant conflicts that limit their ability to
effectively police the markets and protect investors from their members’
misconduct.179
C. Enforcement Actions
For regulations and rules to be substantively meaningful and
effective, they must be followed, which typically requires enforcement.
Enforcement powers can be used to achieve two goals: deterrence and
compliance.180 Specifically, enforcement powers provide regulators with
the leverage necessary to deter bad actors and induce compliance by
uncooperative entities through large financial losses, greater
supervision, and other punitive consequences.181 For example, the
SEC’s Division of Enforcement claims that its enforcement actions have
specific benefits for improving integrity and fairness in the market.182
174.
Id. at 6.
175.
See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 648
(2000); What We Do, FIN. INDUS. REGUL. AUTH., https://www.finra.org/about/what-we-do
[https://perma.cc/6ZTS-WSRJ] (last visited Aug. 20, 2021) (stating that FINRA operates “at no cost
to taxpayers”).
176.
See Freeman, supra note 175, at 647.
177.
See Barry M. Mitnick, Capturing ‘Capture’: Definition and Mechanisms, in
HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 34, 35 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2011) (discussing
regulatory “capture”). For example, in 2016, Senators Elizabeth Warren and Tom Cotton sent a
letter to FINRA claiming that the organization failed to take appropriate disciplinary action to
curb repeated misconduct by its members. Letter from Sen. Elizabeth Warren & Sen. Tom
Cotton to Richard G. Ketchum, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth. (May
11, 2016), https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2016-5-11_WarrenCotton_Letter_to_FINRA.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2E6-2Q58].
178.
See Freeman, supra note 175, at 647–48.
179.
State Securities Regulators Outline Opposition to Investment Adviser SRO, N. AM.
SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N (Sept. 13, 2011), https://www.nasaa.org/5590/state-securities-regulators-outline-opposition-to-investment-adviser-sro/ [https://perma.cc/7M75-Z8ZZ].
180.
See, e.g., Harry First, The Case for Antitrust Civil Penalties, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 127,
134 (2009).
181.
See Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle & Andrew Dorchak, Choosing How
To Regulate, 29 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 179, 230–31 (2005).
182.
DIV. OF ENF’T, SEC, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2019), https://www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-annual-report-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/QR9X-TTBX].
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These include removing bad actors, stopping frauds, preventing losses,
and returning funds to harmed investors.183 Enforcement powers can
also secure compliance through cooperative models, which emphasize
compliance rather than strictly punishing wrongdoing.184 Further, the
Supreme Court highlighted several situations in which enforcement is
preferable to rulemaking as a regulatory model.185 For example,
enforcement is desirable when unforeseeable and highly specialized
problems arise, and when “the agency may not have had sufficient
experience with a particular problem to warrant rigidifying its
tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule.”186 Consequently,
enforcement actions provide regulators with a precise yet flexible tool
to address new problems compared to traditional command-and-control
regulation.187
Regulators have a range of tools within their enforcement
powers to ensure compliance, including fines, penalties, cease and
desist orders, consent orders, license revocation, as well as the ability
to institute informal enforcement actions or formal actions such as
administrative proceedings and civil actions.188 The SEC has used
enforcement actions and civil litigation to monitor intentional misuse
and unintentional malfunction of algorithms in securities trading.189 In
2011, for example, the SEC charged three investment advisers with
securities fraud for willfully concealing that an error in its quantitative
investment model disabled one of the model’s risk controls and resulted
183.
Id.
184.
Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1189 (1998).
185.
See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1947).
186.
Id.
187.
See Christine Parker, Reducing the Risk of Policy Failure: Challenges for Regulatory
Compliance 21 (Organisation for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Working Paper No. 77, 2000),
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/1910833.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZR2-96M6].
188.
VAL SRINIVAS, DANIEL BYLER, RICHA WADHWANI, ALOK RANJAN & VAMSI
KRISHNA, DELOITTE CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS., ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS IN THE
BANKING INDUSTRY: TRENDS AND LESSONS LEARNED 16–18 (2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/us/articles/bank-enforcement-actions-trends-in-banking-industry/DUP1372_EnforcementActionsBanking_120815.pdf [https://perma.cc/QL6E-KCH7]; CONG.
RSCH. SERV., R44918, WHO REGULATES WHOM? AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK 2–3 (2020), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44918.pdf [https://perma.cc/2V9Y-NACX].
189.
See, e.g., SEC, RELEASE NO. 2011-37, SEC CHARGES AXA ROSENBERG
ENTITIES FOR CONCEALING ERROR IN QUANTITATIVE INVESTMENT MODEL (2011),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-37.htm [https://perma.cc/G3YU-LBJV] [hereinafter
SEC RELEASE NO. 2011-37] (intentional misuse); SEC, RELEASE NO. 2018-300, SEC CHARGES TWO
ROBO-ADVISORS WITH FALSE DISCLOSURES (2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018300 [https://perma.cc/6X3X-NAZB] [hereinafter SEC RELEASE NO. 2018-300] (unintentional
malfunction).
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in $217 million in investor losses before being secretly rectified.190
Model risk also stems from unintentional model error.191 An example of
this is the SEC enforcement action against the robo-adviser,
Wealthfront Advisers LLC.192 The SEC charged Wealthfront with
making false statements about investment products and publishing
misleading advertising after its statements regarding its advertised
tax-loss harvesting strategy when, in fact, the wash sale detection
algorithm failed to flag such transactions for 31 percent of accounts
enrolled in the strategy.193
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is another active
regulator that routinely relies on enforcement actions to address
anti-competitive and “AI-generated consumer harms.”194 Recently, the
FTC warned that it would pursue enforcement actions against firms
that sell or use algorithms and AI that result in discriminatory
outcomes in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, and the ECOA.195 Notably, the FTC settled a complaint
against photo app developer, Everalbum, for misleading consumers by
misrepresenting users’ ability to control the company’s use of their
photographs to train facial recognition algorithms.196 In the Everalbum
action, the remedy included “disgorgement” of the improper data as well
as deletion of the facial recognition models and algorithms developed
with the ill-gotten data.197 In an agency publication, the FTC
emphasized that AI best practices should include good data, routine
testing of algorithms for discriminatory outcomes, transparency and
honesty about the capabilities of a company’s technology, and
accountability.198
190.
SEC RELEASE NO. 2011-37, supra note 189.
191.
See Robo Advisor Wealthfront Sanctioned by SEC, CONVEX LEGAL (Jan. 16, 2019),
https://convexlegal.com/sec-sanctions-robo-adviser-wealthfront [https://perma.cc/X5A5-NML4].
192.
SEC RELEASE NO. 2018-300, supra note 189.
193.
Id.; Robo Advisor Wealthfront Sanctioned by SEC, supra note 191.
194.
Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, Acting Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the
Future of Privacy Forum: Protecting Consumer Privacy in a Time of Crisis (Feb. 10, 2021),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1587283/fpf_opening_remarks_210_.pdf [https://perma.cc/KG2K-DPP5].
195.
See Elisa Jillson, Aiming for Truth, Fairness, and Equity in Your Company’s Use of
AI, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Apr. 19, 2021, 9:43 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/businessblog/2021/04/aiming-truth-fairness-equity-your-companys-use-ai [https://perma.cc/C937-ZB5X].
196.
Id.
197.
Id.; Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, Acting FTC Chair Slaughter Speaks on Protecting
Privacy and Data Security, COLUMBIA L. SCH.: THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Feb. 16, 2021),
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2021/02/16/acting-ftc-chair-slaughter-speaks-on-protectingprivacy-and-data-security/ [https://perma.cc/DTV4-3ACJ].
198.
See Jillson, supra note 195; Andrew Smith, Using Artificial Intelligence and Algorithms, FED. TRADE COMM’N: BUS. BLOG (Apr. 8, 2020, 9:58 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
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The SEC and other regulators may refer violations to the DOJ
for criminal prosecution.199 Previously, the DOJ addressed the use of
pricing algorithms and antitrust compliance by pursuing criminal
charges for AI-enabled illegal activity.200 For example, working with the
FTC, the DOJ settled AI-related enforcement actions against three
ticket brokers who used an algorithm to purchase large amounts of
tickets and then resell them at higher prices in violation of the Better
Online Ticket Sales Act.201 In 2015, the DOJ filed antitrust
charges against an e-commerce executive for developing pricing
software, and then colluding with co-conspirators to use the
price-setting algorithms to coordinate the prices of posters sold
online.202
However, overreliance on enforcement can hamper industry
growth and may not be administratively feasible.203 Over the years,
policymakers and regulators have issued new rules and expanded
existing ones to address various problems.204 The cumulative effect has
been a complex web of requirements that are difficult and expensive for
large firms to understand and comply with, let alone middle-and
small-sized firms.205 Thus, enforcement actions may penalize smaller
firms for failing to keep up with these regulations.206 Further, in
an uncertain regulatory landscape, emerging technologies face a
events/blogs/business-blog/2020/04/using-artificial-intelligence-algorithms
[https://perma.cc/XTL3-6K6M]; see also REGULATORY NOTICE 15-09, supra note 156 (proposing
various risk management suggestions for algorithmic trading firms).
199.
Elad L. Roisman, Hester M. Pierce, Allison Herren Lee & Caroline A. Crenshaw,
Statement on Proposed 2011 Fraud-Detection Program and Related 2012 Opinion of the DOJ Office
of Legal Counsel, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/statement-proposed-2011-fraud-detection-program [https://perma.cc/V6FP-4K5K].
200.
See CREIGHTON MACY, DAN GRAULICH & MATTHEW BESTER, ANTITRUST
COMPLIANCE AND PRICING ALGORITHMS 2 (2019), https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/files/people/graulich-daniel/bloomberg-law-antitrust-compliance-and-pricing-algorithms-dec2019.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/2BJG-TZJU].
201.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., RELEASE NO. 21-84, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND FTC ANNOUNCE
FIRST ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE BETTER ONLINE TICKET SALES ACT (2021),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-ftc-announce-first-enforcement-actions-violations-better-online-ticket [https://perma.cc/45TQ-NPGR].
202.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., RELEASE NO. 15-421, FORMER E-COMMERCE EXECUTIVE CHARGED
WITH PRICE FIXING IN THE ANTITRUST DIVISION’S FIRST ONLINE MARKETPLACE PROSECUTION
(2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-e-commerce-executive-charged-price-fixing-antitrust-divisions-first-online-marketplace [https://perma.cc/85F5-AJ6G]; see also MACY ET AL., supra
note 200.
203.
See Parker, supra note 187, at 7–8, 14.
204.
Id. at 14.
205.
Id.
206.
Id. at 15 (discussing the effect of regulation complexity).
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double-edged sword. On the one hand, deploying such technology
without regulatory blessing may result in significant fines and
penalties when regulators determine ex post that these actions are
impermissible.207 On the other hand, more cautious market actors may
decide not to launch and may curb innovation altogether, fearing the
risk of regulatory uncertainty.208 Enforcement, therefore, can be a
flexible mechanism for regulators to address financial AI, but singular
reliance upon enforcement powers is unsustainable.209
IV. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
Implementing a regulatory framework for AI in the financial
markets is a difficult and wide-ranging feat. AI is complex and
ever-changing,210 rendering some forms of backward-looking
regulations obsolete before they have a chance to be enacted.211 Thus,
regulators must be forward-looking in their approach to remain
relevant and effective.
To do so, regulators should be mindful of four elements when
developing a regulatory framework to hold AI accountable in the
financial markets. First, future policies should not shy away from tying
AI accountability to (a) specific human(s) that develop, test, and deploy
these tools. Second, AI’s data dependency problem means that effective
regulation must include data regulation as well. Third, given the high
stakes surrounding AI, government regulators ought to rely on
self-regulation sparingly. Fourth, regulators should be aware that
policies created specifically for existing AI techniques, such as machine
learning, may not be as relevant or effective for newer AI technologies
that leverage deep learning techniques, such as generative adversarial
neural networks and capsule networks.
207.
Gregory N. Mandel, Regulating Emerging Technologies, 1 LAW INNOVATION & TECH.
75, 78–81 (2009).
208.
See SRINIVAS ET AL., supra note 188, at 17 (discussing the impact of enforcement
actions on the banking industry); Turner Wright, SEC Enforcement Actions Cost Crypto
Firms and Individuals $1.7B in Penalties, COINTELEGRAPH (May 12, 2021),
https://cointelegraph.com/news/sec-enforcement-actions-cost-crypto-firms-and-individuals-1-7bin-penalties [https://perma.cc/72CQ-J27A] (discussing how enforcement actions have impacted
issuers of cryptocurrencies).
209.
See Parker, supra note 187, at 7.
210.
Daniel Shapiro, Artificial Intelligence: It’s Complicated and Unsettling, but
Inevitable, FORBES (Sept. 10, 2019, 8:58 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielshapiro1/2019/09/10/artificial-intelligence-its-complicated-and-unsettling-but-inevitable/?sh=2322032e26f2 [https://perma.cc/4R38-HLCQ].
211.
Cf. Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark and a Postscript Assessment of the Iron
Law of Financial Regulation, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 25, 27 (2014) (explaining that backward-looking
regulations in dynamic environments fail to keep up with industry practices).
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A. Humans in the Loop
One element that ought to be part of the AI landscape is humans.
Developers design AI to minimize future human intervention as much
as possible;212 however, human involvement should not be shunned
entirely. Rather, it is necessary to include humans at key intervals to
ensure that there is accountability for the algorithm’s decision-making
and impact on the markets.213
For example, the Financial Stability Board describes a “human
in the loop” system in which there is a designated responsible director
manager for AI.214 Under this system, there ought to be distinct human
roles in model risk management for ownership, controls, and
compliance where the model owner would assume ultimate
accountability and “be responsible for ensuring that models are
properly developed, implemented, and used.”215 A human would also be
responsible for proper validation, approval, and updates of the
models.216
FINRA adopted a lighter version of this system in 2017.217
FINRA rule 1220 (b)(4)(A) requires “each associated person [with a
member] who is primarily responsible for the design, development or
significant modification of an algorithmic trading strategy relating to
equity, preferred or convertible debt securities, or who is responsible for
the day-to-day supervision or direction of such activities” to meet the
same minimum competency standards for knowledge of securities
regulations as is applicable to individual securities traders, e.g., pass

212.
See Emilie C. Schwarz, Human vs. Machine: A Framework of Responsibilities and
Duties of Transnational Corporations for Respecting Human Rights in the Use of Artificial
Intelligence, 58 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 232, 254–55 (2019).
213.
See Gaurav Aggarwal, How Humans-in-the-Loop AI Can Help Solve
the
Data
Problem,
FORBES
(Oct.
27,
2021,
8:30
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2021/10/27/how-humans-in-the-loop-ai-can-helpsolve-the-data-problem/?sh=76330c3048b6 [https://perma.cc/UPP3-JLEH].
214.
See FIN. STABILITY BD., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING
IN
FINANCIAL SERVICES 7 (2017), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P011117.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X23J-9MZV]. The Financial Stability Board is an international body that
develops and promotes standards for financial stability. See generally DOMENICO LOMBARDI,
BROOKINGS INST., THE GOVERNANCE OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD (2011),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/FSB_Issues_Paper_Lombardi.pdf
[https://perma.cc/38TU-68P5] (discussing the creation and role of the Financial Stability Board).
215.
See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FIL-22-2017, SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE ON
MODEL RISK MANAGEMENT 15 (2017), https://www.fdic.gov/news/financial-institution-letters/2017/fil17022a.pdf [https://perma.cc/WB8C-7VFU].
216.
See id.
217.
See generally REGULATORY NOTICE 16-21, supra note 150.
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the Series 57 exam and register as a Securities Trader.218 To make this
rule more robust, FINRA should require not just competency but also
impose ultimate responsibility on this person for the failings of the
algorithm, without the need for deliberate misconduct. This would
incentivize traders to triple-check their work and limit the potential for
misuse of algorithms.
B. Data Regulation & Validation
Given the extent to which AI depends on data,219 data regulation
and verification must be included in a holistic regulatory approach. The
centrality of data to AI applicability means that the inputs used to test
and design the algorithm are of paramount importance to the
algorithm’s integrity.220 Recognizing the importance of regulating the
data, various state Attorney Generals have called for the CFPB to
revise its no-action letter policy regarding AI use in credit decisions.221
As discussed earlier, Upstart’s credit decision-making model not only
utilizes a modern method, but also is encouraged by regulators.222
Specifically, under its current policy, the CFPB takes a friendlier
approach to alternative data.223 For example, the CFPB has issued two
No-Action Letters to Upstart stating that it has no present intention to
take enforcement or supervisory action against the company under the
ECOA, based on its use of alternative data in its underwriting.224

218.
See id. at 1, 3. FINRA rule 1220(b)(4)(A) replaced NASD rule 1032(f), which is the
subject of the regulatory notice.
219.
Joe McKendrick, The Data Paradox: Artificial Intelligence Needs Data;
Data
Needs
AI,
FORBES
(June
27,
2021,
11:59
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/joemckendrick/2021/06/27/the-data-paradox-artificial-intelligenceneeds-data-data-needs-ai/?sh=15d51fcf71a5 [https://perma.cc/6MPP-YX9U].
220.
Sameer Rane, Complementing Data Quality Management with AI/ML for Meaningful
Data Insights, TATA CONSULTANCY SERVS.: BUS. & TECH. INSIGHTS (July 6, 2021),
https://www.tcs.com/blogs/artificial-intelligence-data-quality-management
[https://perma.cc/KW3D-MS4X].
221.
Letitia James, N.Y. Att’y Gen., Comment Letter on Proposed Policy on
No-Action
Letters
and
the
BCFP
Product
Sandbox
(Feb.
11,
2019),
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/cfpb_nal_and_sandbox_comment_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/826Y-WNFH] [hereinafter Comment Letter].
222.
See supra Section I.A.1; Rouse, supra note 35.
223.
Comment Letter, supra note 221.
224.
Letter from Christopher M. D’Angelo, Assoc. Dir. for Supervision, Enf’t & Fair
Lending, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, to Thomas P. Brown, Paul Hastings, LLP (Sept. 14, 2017),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201709_cfpb_upstart-no-action-letter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K38G-8DFU]; Letter from Edward Blatnik, Acting Assistant Dir., Off. of
Innovation, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, to Alison Nicoll, Gen. Couns., Upstart Network, Inc.
(Nov. 30, 2020), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_upstart-network-inc_no-
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Notably, the policy has some important features aimed at increasing
regulatory oversight of the AI’s use.225 Pursuant to the No-Action
Letters, Upstart is required to notify the CFPB of significant changes
to its model prior to implementation.226 Upstart is also required to
provide the CFPB with its source code used to model risk assessment,
test its model for adverse impact, and provide the results of these tests
to the CFPB, among other things.227
One thing to highlight in this regard is that regulators ought to
consider whether and to what extent data regulation and verification
should also require regulatory access to AI source code.228 A few years
ago, as part of its proposed rules to regulate trading algorithms, the
CFTC proposed source code access as part of its regulatory
framework.229 Arguably, this inclusion doomed the proposed rule as the
industry, and many others, considered this a bridge too far.230 However,
this Article challenges this knee-jerk reaction and posits that access to
the source code should be viewed as a necessary element of AI
supervision and oversight. Indeed, data verification without source code
access lacks efficacy. In other words, without insight into how the
algorithm uses the data through accessing the source code, data
verification is an empty exercise.231 To be clear, however, source code
access is insufficient in and of itself in regulating AI, but it is a
necessary and important aspect in regulating algorithms and
minimizing their potential harms.

action-letter_2020-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2GF-FVZP] [hereinafter Letter from Blatnik to
Nicoll].
225.
See Letter from Blatnik to Nicoll, supra note 225.
226.
Id.
227.
Id.
228.
See Kroll et al., supra note 131 (discussing static analysis of an algorithm’s source code
only).
229.
See Regulation Automated Trading, 81 Fed. Reg. 85,334, 85,337 (proposed Nov. 25,
2016); COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, FACT SHEET - SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE
OF
PROPOSED
RULEMAKING
ON
REGULATION
AUTOMATED
TRADING
(2016),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/regat_factsheet110316.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3RM-CU8G].
230.
See Regulation Automated Trading, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,824, 78,947 (proposed Dec. 17,
2015) (“Regulation AT dramatically lowers the bar for the federal government to obtain this
information [a source code repository for algorithms].”); see also Gregory Meyer & Philip Stafford,
US
Regulators
Propose
Powers
To
Scrutinise
Algo
Traders’
Source
Code,
FIN.
TIMES
(Dec.
1,
2015),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/137f81bc-944f-11e5-b190291e94b77c8f.html#axzz47pavqdzF [https://perma.cc/L4Y7-ZS28] (explaining concerns of HF
trading firms in response to the new regulation).
231.
See generally Examining the CFTC’s Proposed Rule: Regulation Automated Trading:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Agric., 114th Cong (2016).
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C. Limited Self-Regulation
In developing and designing a regulatory regime for AI, a
licensing and certification regime, similar to the Food and Drug
Administration,232 is a promising possibility. A regulatory licensing
regime would require firms to submit applications with detailed
information regarding the AI’s function, client protection features, the
regulatory capital allocated for the financial and operational risk of the
AI, and contingency plans for the AI’s failure to a government agency.233
Undoubtedly, such a regime would be costly and could run the risk of
stifling innovation;234 there would be great difficulty in changing or
updating authorized AIs as these would likely require additional
licensing or certification.235 However, a licensing regime could establish
a baseline of what types of AI programs are acceptable or low risk and,
in this way, could steer innovation and development in a
regulatory-preferred direction.
The challenges associated with direct government oversight
raise the possibility of industry-led self-regulation.236 The financial
markets are exceedingly familiar with the self-regulatory model, which
relies on the private sector to develop and adopt its own codes of conduct
and best practices.237 These industry standards could ensure that
algorithms developed have fair, efficient, and stable outcomes, resulting
in greater benefit to both users and society.238 Proponents of industry

232.
See The FDA Licensing Process, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/science-research/licensing-and-collaboration-opportunities/fda-licensing-process
[https://perma.cc/D4YE-5743] (Feb. 26, 2018).
233.
Katyal, supra note 89, at 111; Kroll et al., supra note 132, at 673 (discussing
certification); Dirk A. Zetzsche, Douglas Arner, Ross Buckley & Brian W. Tang, Artificial
Intelligence in Finance: Putting the Human in the Loop 34–35 (Ctr. for Fin., Tech. &
Entrepreneurship, Univ. of H.K. Fac. of L. Rsch. Paper No. 2020/006, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3531711
[https://perma.cc/7HSA-5KRU]
(discussing licensing).
234.
Zetzsche et al., supra note 233, at 35.
235.
Id.
236.
See Kroll et al., supra note 132, at 702–03.
237.
See CFA INST. CTR. FOR FIN. MKT. INTEGRITY, SELF-REGULATION IN TODAY’S
SECURITIES MARKETS: OUTDATED SYSTEM OR WORK IN PROGRESS? iii (2007), https://www.cfainstitute.org/-/media/documents/article/position-paper/self-regulation-in-todays-securities-marketsoutdated-system-or-work-in-progress.ashx [https://perma.cc/B7B6-WNES].
238.
Katyal, supra note 89, at 108–10; see John Markoff, How Tech Giants Are
Devising Real Ethics for Artificial Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/02/technology/artificial-intelligence-ethics.html
[https://perma.cc/JEM7-9MZD]. For example, the Association for Computing Machinery proposed
seven principles for algorithmic transparency and accountability:
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codes of conduct argue that such best practices can serve as a
benchmark for regulatory and public auditing to ensure accuracy and
accountability.239 How well voluntary standards mesh with formal
government regulations will depend on the government agencies’
relationship with that industry, whether that be positive or more
skeptical.240 Moreover, there is a significant risk of inadequate
regulation or oversight given the ability for codes of conduct to simply
aggregate private preferences, rather than prioritize risk regulation
and public concerns.241
Importantly, policymakers should take a critical approach to
self-regulation. Self-regulation is an often-proposed solution to deal
with complex industries, such as finance and AI.242 This Article
encourages policymakers to approach self-regulation cautiously. This is
not because self-regulation is objectionable per se, but because the
stakes are too high for industry regulation to be the primary mechanism
to oversee AI in the financial markets. Self-regulation is fraught with
conflicts of interest because it asks industry insiders to subordinate
their self-interest to that of the public.243 These conflicts limit the
efficacy of self-regulation and possibly the vigor with which the
industry would be regulated.244 Regulating AI in finance should
remain a public regulatory function and not be delegated to
self-regulation because the potential issues supersede (or ought to
(1) awareness of possible biases in design, implementation, and use; (2) access and redress mechanisms to allow individuals to question and address adverse effects of algorithmically informed decisions; (3) accountability, ensuring that individuals are held
responsible for decisions made by algorithms that they use; (4) an explanation regarding both the procedures that the algorithm follows as well as the specific decisions that
are made; (5) data provenance, meaning a description of the way that the training data
was collected, along with ‘an exploration of the potential biases induced by the human
or algorithmic data-gathering process’; (6) auditability, enabling models, algorithms,
data and decisions to be recorded for audit purposes; and (7) validation and testing,
ensuring the use of rigorous models to avoid discriminatory harm.
Katyal, supra note 89, at 109.
239.
See Katyal, supra note 89, at 112.
240.
See Freeman, supra note 175.
241.
See id. at 648–49.
242.
See generally Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial
Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411 (2011).
243.
See id. at 467–68 (discussing the controversy surrounding SROs in the securities industry namely, the “the conflict of interest inherent in their dual function as regulators and profitseeking economic enterprises”).
244.
See Mitnick, supra note 177, at 34–36 (defining regulatory “capture” to describe
situations where “government regulation tend[s] to serve the interests of regulated parties over
more general public interests”). See generally BARRY M. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
REGULATION 206–33 (1980) (discussing political and economic theories of capture).
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supersede) the private interests of programmers and firms in
developing AI. The lack of AI expertise among the financial regulators
should not serve as a reason to promote self-regulation of AI in the
financial markets.245 Rather, it ought to emphasize the importance of
bolstering and improving the technological capacities of those charged
with overseeing the markets.
D. Looking Further into the Future
A major theme of this Article is that technology continues to
develop at a speed that regulation cannot catch up with, let alone
overcome. One new trend relates to generative adversarial artificial
intelligence,246 and the “intentional manipulation of input data in order
to fool [AI] systems or lead them to unintended results.”247 For example,
wrongdoers may be able to identify the patterns of behavior that trigger
fraud alerts and alter their behavior to avoid the algorithm’s
detection.248 Additionally, hedge funds or other quant firms that
increasingly rely upon high-speed trading algorithms may be concerned
that competitors who discover trading strategies based on proprietary
algorithms will be able to manipulate the market using this
information.249 Such AI innovations present dangerous threats to the
integrity of an AI algorithm and to the broader cybersecurity of the
financial institution that employs it.250
While this Article focuses on machine learning, developers are
quickly designing and implementing faster and smarter deep-learning
techniques.251 In addition to generative adversarial networks, capsule
networks provide the benefit of being able to model a “hierarchical
structure of part-to-whole relationships” between the features extracted
from the data.252 In contrast, machine-learning techniques can only
extract the distinct features of data but cannot model the

245.
See Magnuson, supra note 10, at 372 (noting that regulators would need to obtain
high-level expertise in AI and machine learning).
246.
For a discussion of generative adversarial AI, see Thomas Wood, What Is a
Generative Adversarial Network?, DEEP AI, https://deepai.org/machine-learning-glossary-andterms/generative-adversarial-network [https://perma.cc/44CL-CNZR] (last visited Mar. 9, 2022).
247.
Id. at 365.
248.
See id.
249.
Wilcox, supra note 54.
250.
See id.
251.
See Nadav Maman, The Advanced Threat Potential of Deep Learning, DEEP INSTINCT
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interrelationships between these features.253 Technology continues to
advance at an amazing pace and, as is often the case, significantly
outpaces the rate at which regulators can properly assess and address
any outsized risks posed by these complex, emerging technologies.254
V. CONCLUSION
AI has revolutionized financial markets in significant ways.255 It
has increased access for historically marginalized communities,256
decreased transactions costs,257 and increased risk management within
large, systemically important institutions.258 But with these benefits,
there are attendant risks. As AI continues to expand its footprint in the
financial markets, it is imperative that regulators take a fresh look at
whether traditional regulatory frameworks can properly and effectively
address its associated risks. As regulators try to balance the benefits of
AI against the challenges of holding AI accountable, they ought to be
guided by the importance of human responsibility for AI conduct and
the significance of data regulation to proper AI operation. Additionally,
regulators should be wary of expanding self-regulation to deal with the
risks of AI. Holding AI accountable is no easy feat; it requires a
forward-looking approach that considers the benefits of the technology
and its risks for the markets and society as a whole.
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